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Introduction
It is impossible that one action is morally impermissible and another per-
missible unless they differ also in some other respect; perhaps one involves
stealing but the other doesn’t. One person cannot be morally better or more
virtuous than another without there being some other difference between
them, such as that one is more reliably disposed to help others or to keep
her promises. It cannot be that you have a reason to run for the bus on one
occasion but no reason to do so on another if the situations differ in no other
qualitative respect, such as how efficient each action will be for achieving
your aims or for doing something good. If two persons are qualitatively ex-
actly alike (or “indiscernible”) in all other ways, they cannot but be morally
alike as well.
The above claims look immensely plausible. Each is a way of saying that
some normative feature (moral permissibility, moral goodness, reasons for
action) is supervenient. Collectively they suggest that normative features, as
a family comprising moral features and all other normative and evaluative
features, such as aesthetic and prudential values and reasons – are superve-
nient. There are several different relations that go by the name of superve-
nience, but they all share this core idea: things cannot differ in one respect
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without differing in some other respect. (See McLaughlin and Bennett 2011
and McPherson 2015 for excellent overviews of supervenience in general and
in ethics, respectively.) Because supervenience is a necessary connection, it
requires explanation. Different metaethical theories may explain the connec-
tion in different ways. But if a theory cannot provide a good explanation, this
makes it in one respect worse than its rivals. The supervenience challenge
says this is the predicament of non-naturalist moral realism.
Non-naturalism is a form of moral realism – a family of views according
to which there are moral truths that are objective and metaphysically robust.
(If a proposition p objectively true, in the sense realists have in mind, p is true
independently of anyone’s attitudes, stances, beliefs, and theories concern-
ing whether p. Moreover, the realist notion of truth isn’t merely deflation-
ary but carries ontological commitment.) In slightly different terminology,
moral predicates, such as ‘good’, ‘wrong’, and ‘permissible’, refer to objective
moral properties in a metaphysically significant sense, and at least some such
properties have instances. If the claim ‘Stealing simply for one’s own gain is
wrong’ is true, what makes it true is the fact that stealing simply for one’s
own gain has a metaphysically significant attitude-independent property of
being wrong.
The distinctive claim of non-naturalist moral realism is that these moral
properties, and perhaps normative properties in general, are sui generis –
significantly different in kind from any other properties. (Contemporary
non-naturalists include Hampton 1998, Shafer-Landau 2003, Cuneo 2007,
FitzPatrick 2008, Enoch 2011, Wielenberg 2014, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau
2014, and Skarsaune 2015. Some of these authors characterize non-naturalism
as “robust” moral realism.) To spell this out a bit, the non-naturalist thinks
that at least some normative properties aren’t identical with any natural or
supernatural properties, nor do they have a real definition, metaphysical re-
duction, or any other such tight metaphysical explanation wholly in terms
of natural or supernatural properties. Normative properties are, in short,
discontinuous with natural and supernatural properties. Supernatural prop-
erties are tricky to distinguish from the non-natural, but are meant to include
non-normative properties such as being willed by God. Natural properties are
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(i) such that any synthetic propositions about their instantiations (including
propositions stating any empirical regularities in which they could figure, or
are “such as to” figure) are empirically defeasible or (ii) reducible to prop-
erties that satisfy (i) (Smith 2000: 211-12; Copp 2003: 185). The proper-
ties, kinds, and causal systems studied by the natural sciences, psychology,
and at least some social sciences come out as natural on this criterion, but
so can properties to which we have reliable non-scientific empirical access.
Non-naturalists deny that normative properties are anything like that. What
makes them so? Perhaps, as many non-naturalists suggest, that they are irre-
ducibly normative. (That would distinguish normative properties also from
mathematical properties, which might be neither natural nor supernatural.)
Be that as it may, the core idea of non-naturalist moral realism is that moral
(and other normative) properties are metaphysically sui generis and at least
some of these properties have instances.
So understood, non-naturalism and the supervenience of the moral jointly
entail that moral properties supervene on some properties with which they
are discontinuous. The supervenience challenge says that non-naturalists
cannot explain this connection without making commitments that count sig-
nificantly against their view. So, unless non-naturalism has other merits
worth the cost, we should reject it. In what follows I formulate a version
of this challenge more carefully, consider the most promising non-naturalist
replies to it, and suggest that none of the replies is as yet fully effective.
The Supervenience Challenge
Virtually all metaethical theories seek to accommodate in some way the idea
that there can be no moral difference without some other difference. It is
less clear whether any particular way of fleshing out this core idea of super-
venience is similarly close to common ground in metaethics. Perhaps there is
no supervenience claim that does serious argumentative work without beg-
ging any important metaethical questions (Sturgeon 2009). But some claims
might be suitably neutral for a particular philosophical purpose. I’ll first iden-
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tify a supervenience claim that isn’t question-begging in the context of the
supervenience challenge to non-naturalism, and then explain the challenge.
If things cannot differ morally without differing in some other qualitative
respect, this doesn’t seem to be merely a claim about how things must be
in a given world. To use a classic example from R. M. Hare, if St. Francis
was a good person, then anyone exactly like him in all other respects couldn’t
but have been good as well (Hare 1952: 145). What difference would it
make whether a duplicate of St. Francis were actual or merely possible?
None, it seems. Accordingly, the supervenience challenge to non-naturalism
is best understood in terms of strong supervenience, which constrains varia-
tions among any possible entities. (The contrast is with weak supervenience
which only constrains entities in the same possible world; see Kim 1984.)
Strong supervenience, like supervenience in general, is a purely modal re-
lation. It only entails that certain patterns of variation hold between how
things are in one respect and some other respect. It doesn’t follow that the
supervenient properties are metaphysically dependent on or explained by
properties in the supervenience base. (Everything supervenes on itself, and
the supervenience of one family of properties on another is compatible with
the supervenience of the latter on the former.)
In what follows, it’ll help to be clear about the formal structure of strong
supervenience claims, in particular that they invoke necessity twice:
(SS) (∀F in α)(∀x)[Fx→ (∃G in β)(Gx & (∀y)(Gy→ Fy))]
This formula requires both explanation in ordinary language and interpreta-
tions of the schematic variables and the necessity operators (marked by ‘’).
Variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ pick out individuals like persons or actions. Thus (SS) isn’t
a global supervenience claim to the effect that the world couldn’t have been
different in one type of respect without some other type of difference, but an
individual supervenience claim. (For complications regarding strong global
supervenience, see McLaughlin and Bennett 2011: §4.4.) I’ll take ‘α’ and ‘β ’
to pick out families of properties. We’ll be interested in the case where α is
the family of moral properties; so ‘F’ stands for some specific moral property
in that family. (Of β more below.) So interpreted, (SS) states an ontological
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connection between families of properties, not an ascriptive connection be-
tween types of judgments (Klagge 1988). This interpretation isn’t available
to metaethical expressivists, who eschew ontological commitment to moral
properties and treat supervenience as a constraint on normative judgments
(Hare 1952: 80-81; Hare 1981; Blackburn 1985). (Complications that arise
in the context of “quasi-realist” expressivism are usefully explored in Dreier
2015.)
The interpretation of the necessity operators in (SS) taken as a moral
supervenience claim is controversial. The innermost necessity is typically
taken as metaphysical: whenever something has a moral property M, it has
some (possibly very complex) property that metaphysically necessitates M.
(We’ll revisit this assumption in the last section.) This interpretation reflects
the widely held view that the basic principles of morality are metaphysically
necessary. The outermost necessity is most often taken as conceptual, but
sometimes as metaphysical. (For our purposes, conceptual necessity may be
understood as metaphysical necessity knowable by conceptual reflection. In
other contexts this might require finessing. Taking the outermost necessity
as metaphysical is compatible with but not entailed by the view that moral
supervenience is a substantive moral truth; see Kramer 2009: ch. 10.)
Given this interpretation, (SS) says the following: as a matter of con-
ceptual/metaphysical necessity (the outermost ‘’), when something has a
moral property, it has some (possibly complex) property (from class β) such
that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity (the innermost ‘’), anything that
has the latter property has the moral property. Closer to ordinary English,
we might say that absolutely any morally wrong action has some features
such that anything else with those features cannot but be wrong as well, and
likewise for any other moral property.
In what sort of respect must things differ in order for moral differences to
be possible? Many interpretations of ‘β ’ for moral supervenience have been
proposed: the factual, the natural, the descriptive, the non-moral. These may
all be different, and each interpretation comes with certain costs to metaeth-
ical neutrality (Sturgeon 2009). Fortunately there is a way forward. Call
a property morally involving if either it is a sui generis moral property or its
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correct analysis ineliminably mentions such properties, and say that a base
property is any property that isn’t morally involving (McPherson 2012: 213-
4). This specification of the “supervenience base” generates the following
strong supervenience claim:
SUPERVENIENCE Necessarily, when something has any moral prop-
erty, it has some base property such that, as a matter of
metaphysical necessity, anything that is exactly alike it with
respect to the base property also has the moral property.
SUPERVENIENCE is a general rather than specific supervenience claim: it only
requires some or other difference in base respects for a moral difference, and
says nothing about which specific base properties moral properties supervene
on. Thus it is neutral between various first-order theories in normative ethics.
Nor does SUPERVENIENCE beg any important metaethical questions at
stake in the supervenience challenge to non-naturalism. If moral properties
are both supervenient and sui generis, as non-naturalists typically claim, they
must supervene on a set of base properties with which they are discontinu-
ous. So SUPERVENIENCE follows from non-naturalism. (When talking about
non-naturalism, it is usually safe to assume that all base properties are non-
moral properties, and I’ll sometimes talk this way.) Moral realists in general
can accept SUPERVENIENCE. Naturalist moral realism, for example, says that
moral properties belong to the category of natural properties. This entails
that moral properties are base properties, not morally involving properties.
Thus, since everything supervenes on itself, moral properties cannot change
without some base properties also changing, namely themselves. So SUPER-
VENIENCE follows trivially from moral naturalism. Nihilist metaethical views
can also accept SUPERVENIENCE. For if nothing instantiates moral proper-
ties, it follows trivially that any items that are alike with respect to all base
properties are exactly alike morally. They’ll be morally void.
The impossibility of moral differences without base differences is plausi-
bly not brute, so it requires explanation. The version of the supervenience
challenge to non-naturalism which I’ll discuss is generated by conjoining SU-
PERVENIENCE with a claim concerning what non-naturalism says about SU-
6
PERVENIENCE and a plausible methodological assumption. (My formulation
of the challenge will largely follow McPherson 2012: 217-9.)
The methodological assumption in question concerns necessary connec-
tions between discontinuous properties. Such connections often have expla-
nations. Necessarily, if something is a brick, it is identical to itself. But this
necessary connection between the seemingly very different kinds of proper-
ties of being a brick and being self-identical has an explanation: everything
is necessarily identical to itself and any conditional with a metaphysically
necessary consequent is itself metaphysically necessary (Leary forthcoming).
Since many necessary connections between discontinuous properties have
explanations, leaving such a connection brute and unexplained looks like a
cost. One methodological principle that one might take this point to suggest
is the following:
MODEST HUMEAN Commitment to brute necessary connections
between discontinuous properties counts significantly against
a view. (McPherson 2012: 217.)
MODEST HUMEAN allows that positing brute necessary connections might not
rule out a view if it has merits that overall outweigh the cost (McPherson
2012: 218.) Thus MODEST HUMEAN is weaker than the more familiar (and
more controversial) “Hume’s Dictum” which rules out any metaphysically
necessary connections (brute or otherwise) between distinct entities (Lewis
1983: 366; for critical discussion, see Wilson 2010). The supervenience chal-
lenge might also get by with something weaker still than MODEST HUMEAN
(Leary forthcoming).
Since the non-naturalist claims that moral properties are sui generis, she
cannot explain the necessary connection in SUPERVENIENCE by the usual ex-
pedients of analysis, reduction, or identity. Such explanations would make
moral properties continuous with base properties. But if moral and base
properties are discontinuous, why should it be impossible for things to differ
morally without differing in base respects? Whence a bar on such varia-
tions? The following claim about moral non-naturalism has at least prima
facie plausibility:
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BRUTE CONNECTION The non-naturalist must take the superve-
nience of moral properties on base properties to involve a
brute necessary connection between discontinuous proper-
ties. (McPherson 2012: 217.)
SUPERVENIENCE, BRUTE CONNECTION, and MODEST HUMEAN jointly entail
that moral non-naturalism is committed to brute necessary connections which
count significantly against its plausibility.
This formulation of the supervenience challenge to moral non-naturalism
differs from others that wear the same label. Perhaps the most discussed
version of the challenge is due to Simon Blackburn, who takes a claim much
like SUPERVENIENCE to be a conceptual truth and uses its alleged conceptual
status to argue against moral realism in general (Blackburn 1984: 182-90;
1985). This is an overreach: supervenience doesn’t raise problems for natu-
ralist moral realism (Dreier 1992; Sturgeon 2009). The supervenience chal-
lenge above targets only moral non-naturalism. Moreover, it can be stated by
treating the outermost necessity in SUPERVENIENCE as metaphysical, brack-
eting the question whether that necessity might also be conceptual.
I’ll now turn to the most promising replies to this version of the superve-
nience challenge. I’ll first consider the prospects of rejecting BRUTE CONNEC-
TION and then discuss whether non-naturalists might avoid the challenge
by rejecting SUPERVENIENCE. I’ll largely bracket MODEST HUMEAN since it
isn’t special to ethics but a general methodological principle that requires
broader assessment. (For a prima facie case that MODEST HUMEAN is self-
undermining, see Wielenberg 2014: 33-34.)
Reject BRUTE CONNECTION?
Among the three premises that generate the supervenience challenge to non-
naturalism, BRUTE CONNECTION seems the most vulnerable. Even if SUPER-
VENIENCE isn’t explicable by some continuity between moral and base prop-
erties, this doesn’t entail that it has no other explanation. Non-naturalists
may thus seek to reject BRUTE CONNECTION by offering a positive explana-
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tion of the kind of necessary connection between discontinuous properties
which they take SUPERVENIENCE to assert.
The first response to BRUTE CONNECTION I’ll discuss is the Conceptual
Strategy. Many philosophers regard SUPERVENIENCE as a conceptual truth:
flouting it manifests a conceptual deficiency. The Conceptual Strategy is thus
to explain SUPERVENIENCE by the nature of moral concepts in general. We
would be deeply puzzled by people who, for instance, regard St. Francis as a
good person but at the same time think that there might have been another
person with exactly the same character and behavior and placed in exactly
the same circumstances, but differed from St. Francis only in not being a
good person. Our puzzlement is evidence that such speakers either mani-
fest a deficient grasp of the concept of moral goodness or are talking about
something else, and thus evidence that SUPERVENIENCE is a conceptual truth.
No further explanation is needed. Explaining general moral supervenience
saddles non-naturalism with no additional ontological cost beyond its distinc-
tive commitment to sui generis moral properties. (Stratton-Lake and Hooker
2006: 164; Enoch 2011: 149; Olson 2014: 96-99; Cuneo and Shafer-Landau
2014: 429-30.)
The Conceptual Strategy fails, for two reasons. The first is that it fails to
provide a right kind of metaphysical basis for the connection which it repre-
sents as conceptually necessary. Not all analytic truths have a metaphysical
basis; for example, ‘I am here now’ is analytic but not metaphysically nec-
essary. (I owe this point to Jamie Dreier.) But many do. Even if (as some
philosophers think) it is a conceptual necessity that magnets attract iron, it
still remains to be explained why or how magnets do this. For realists about
magnets and iron, it is fundamentally the world that guarantees attraction
between magnets and iron, not our representations of them. The missing ex-
planation will presumably be the same physical explanation that is accepted
by people who don’t assume that the necessity by which magnets attract iron
is conceptual (Sturgeon 1999: 95). SUPERVENIENCE looks more like ‘Mag-
nets attract iron’ than ‘I am here now’ in this respect, if only because it is
supposed to concern a necessity irrespective of whether the necessity is con-
ceptual. And since SUPERVENIENCE is a connection between families of prop-
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erties, presumably it holds (if it does) irrespective of whether it is reflected
in our concepts. (It should hold irrespective of whether a person who thinks
that someone just like you in every non-moral respect could have been a
much worse person is conceptually deficient or just bad at moralizing.) Thus
it is hard to see how, at least given the terms and conditions of moral realism,
the conceptual status of SUPERVENIENCE is supposed to explain the necessary
connection it states between moral and base properties. The explanation will
point to a metaphysical connection which according to this reply is also re-
flected in moral concepts. The question then arises whether that necessary
metaphysical connection is brute.
The second problem with the Conceptual Strategy is that it explains the
wrong necessity. (This objection is due to Dreier MS.) Recall that strong
supervenience claims like SUPERVENIENCE contain two necessity operators:
necessarily, if any two possible individuals are alike in every base respect,
then they must be alike in every moral respect. Now, when proponents of
the Conceptual Strategy say that SUPERVENIENCE is conceptually necessary,
they mean that the outermost necessity is conceptual. But what about the
innermost one? Reading it as conceptual would entail that the base proper-
ties (whatever they are) attach to the supervening properties with conceptual
necessity. But that isn’t true in the moral case. Propositions that state con-
nections between particular non-moral and moral properties are synthetic,
not analytic. That is why the innermost necessity operator in SUPERVENIENCE
is typically interpreted as metaphysical. So the claim which the Conceptual
Strategy represents as a conceptual truth is a truth about a metaphysical ne-
cessity. But what the supervenience challenge to non-naturalism represents
as needing explanation is the metaphysical necessity by which base proper-
ties necessitate moral properties. The Conceptual Strategy thus explains the
wrong necessity. The puzzle for non-naturalism remains even if SUPERVE-
NIENCE is a conceptual truth: if moral properties are sui generis, how can the
necessary metaphysical connection between non-moral base properties and
moral properties (marked by the innermost necessity operator) be anything
but brute?
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A natural alternative to the Conceptual Strategy is to seek a metaphysi-
cal explanation of SUPERVENIENCE – a Metaphysical Strategy. Think of the
challenge this way: how could there be properties which are sui generis and
yet supervene in the way SUPERVENIENCE says? Any necessary connection
to which non-naturalists may appeal in giving an explanation must hold be-
tween discontinuous properties, because otherwise the explanation won’t be
non-naturalist. And that connection must have an explanation, because ex-
plaining one necessary connection by relying on another brute necessary con-
nection between discontinuous properties would merely relocate the prob-
lem. The Metaphysical Strategy seeks to identify a necessary metaphysical
connection that avoids these problems.
One proposal here is to take moral facts to be exhaustively constituted
by non-moral facts (Shafer-Landau 2003: 87). Suppose that the fact that
Jane is generous is exhaustively constituted by non-moral facts concerning
her disposition to assist those in need without a motive of self-interest, and
the like (Shafer-Landau 2003: 75). If other instances of generosity can be
exhaustively constituted by different non-moral facts, then generosity isn’t
reducible or definable by any particular non-moral constitution base. And
yet if facts to the effect that someone is generous are always exhaustively
constituted by non-moral facts, then things cannot differ with respect to their
generosity without differing non-morally. Thus is SUPERVENIENCE explained.
The constitution view fails to help non-naturalists, for two reasons. First,
if each instance of a moral property is wholly constituted by some concatena-
tion of non-moral properties, this threatens to make moral properties contin-
uous with non-moral properties. The view that instances of mental properties
are constituted by physical properties tends to count as a form of physical-
ism. And consider material constitution: a statue might have modal prop-
erties that the clay constituting it lacks without thereby being a sui generis
type of entity. (Clay-arranged-statue-wise is still clay.) Second, explanations
that are murkier than what they aim to explain are (all else equal) no good.
Suppose a fact is an instantiation of a property by an object (at a time). It
seems that only the property component of facts can carry the structure that
fact constitution would require. But the claim that one and the same prop-
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erty, F, is constituted by G, H, and I on one instantiation but by J, K, and M
on another looks murky – not because it is difficult to grasp (as explanations
in quantum physics might be to a lay person), but because its coherence is
dubious. How can the constitution of a type entity vary across its tokens in
this way? (This problem doesn’t arise in the case of the material constitution
of physical objects.) No murky claims about fact constitution are required if
we say instead that one object can have F in virtue of having G, H, and I and
another object can have F in virtue of having J, K, and M. For instance, saying
that being painful and being autonomy-undermining can each make an expe-
rience bad commits us to no particular metaphysics of badness. (Ridge 2007
discusses a possible reply that goes beyond our scope: if moral properties are
understood as tropes, or abstract particulars, then what gets constituted on
different occasions is a qualitatively similar but numerically distinct entity.)
Nearby variants of the Metaphysical Strategy look to fare no better. Sup-
pose we say instead that moral properties are realized by non-moral prop-
erties, on analogy with how mental states such as beliefs or pains can be
realized by different physical substrata (Shafer-Landau 2003: 77). This anal-
ogy is dubious even if we can make sense of moral properties as a kind of
functional properties. If a subject’s beliefs are realized (at a given time) by
brain states, this excludes the realization of her beliefs (at that time) also
by silicon-based states or computer hardware. But one can be virtuous by
manifesting various different combinations of wisdom, generosity, courage,
and the like. This cannot be explained by saying that the latter are realiz-
ers of virtue. Analogies between moral non-naturalism and non-reductive
physicalism in the philosophy of mind seem generally suspect (Ridge 2007;
McPherson 2012: 224-27).
The Metaphysical Strategy isn’t fully exhausted by these options. One
might, for instance, think that it is in the nature or essence of moral prop-
erties to satisfy SUPERVENIENCE in some specific way or other (Wedgwood
2007: 151, 207). Is this necessary connection between (some or other) base
properties and the nature of moral properties itself a brute connection be-
tween discontinuous properties, and would it be objectionably brute? This
is difficult to assess in abstraction from concrete proposals about the nature
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of moral properties. Thus I’ll merely note the possibility of this kind of ex-
planation of SUPERVENIENCE. (Not all of the necessities involved with SU-
PERVENIENCE might be explicable this way; see Wedgwood 1999 and 2007:
207-20. Wedgwood argues that the remaining necessities involving specific
supervenience facts are explicable by appeal to contingent facts. Assessing
this account would require a long foray into modal logic; but see Schmitt and
Schroeder 2011.)
The last response to BRUTE CONNECTION which I’ll consider is the Substi-
tute Strategy. The idea is that the non-naturalist isn’t committed to necessary
connections between discontinuous properties, but only to certain tolerably
brute necessary normative truths. The most developed instance of the Sub-
stitute Strategy is T. M. Scanlon’s explanation of normative supervenience.
(Scanlon thinks that normative facts exist in an ontologically lightweight
sense, so he isn’t a “robust” non-naturalist realist. But the view below is
compatible with non-naturalism.) Consider ordinary statements of reasons
for action, such as that “the fact that the edge of a piece of metal is sharp is
a reason for me, now, not to press my hand against it” (Scanlon 2014: 30).
This ordinary reason relation only obtains when the piece of metal is in fact
sharp, and it is normatively “mixed” thanks to its non-normative element.
But the mixture has an essentially normative component, of the form R(p, x,
c, a), where R relates a proposition p, an agent x, a circumstance c, and an
action a. To get a rough intuitive grip, think of statements of the form R(p,
x, c, a) as saying that “if p were true, and x were in circumstance c, then one
reason for x to do a would be that p” (Schroeder 2015: 196).
These R truths are normatively “pure” in the sense that they hold irrespec-
tive of how the non-normative facts are (Scanlon 2014: 37-38). By contrast,
ordinary reason claims like the one concerning my reason not to press the
metal are contingent, since it is only contingent that the metal is sharp. What
allows Scanlon to use the special normative relation R to explain normative
supervenience is his view that R(p, x, c, a) is always necessary, if true in the
first place (Scanlon 2014: 40-41). Provided that the agent or the circum-
stances are made sufficiently specific, changing the agent or circumstances
in any way delivers a different tuple from <p, x, c, a>. Tuples that stand in R
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thus have their non-normative features necessarily. So when R holds of <p,
x, c, a>, it does so necessarily, no matter how the non-normative facts had
been. (We’ll return to similar ideas in the last section.) But although pure
normative truths of the form R(p, x, c, a) are necessary, they bear no (other)
necessary connection, brute or otherwise, to non-normative facts. So they
generate no commitment to BRUTE CONNECTION. It is only the mixed nor-
mative truths that cannot vary without a non-normative difference. But the
supervenience of mixed normative facts on the non-normative is explained
by the way they are partly constituted by a relationship to their constituent
non-normative facts. So mixed normative facts generate no commitment to
BRUTE CONNECTION either. In sum, SUPERVENIENCE is explained on the ba-
sis of a conception of “pure” normative facts as facts about a special relation
R(p, x, c, a) such that, if they are necessary, then ordinary “mixed” normative
facts supervene on the non-normative facts. (Schroeder 2014 and Skarsaune
2015 also offer to non-naturalists an explanation of supervenience based on
a conception of basic normative truths on which such truths are always nec-
essary.)
Unfortunately the Substitute Strategy avoids brute necessary relation-
ships between discontinuous properties only by replacing them with other
sort of brute necessary relationships in the vicinity. As Mark Schroeder notes,
“to say that R ever holds of any tuple <p, x, c, a> is just to say that there
are some necessary relationships that hold among wholly distinct entities”
(Schroeder 2015: 197). Is the distinction between brute necessary truths
and brute necessary connections really robust enough to help the Substitute
Strategy avoid the kinds of theoretical costs that motivate MODEST HUMEAN?
In this vicinity lurks also a more general worry about treating normative
truths as brute, which needn’t appeal to MODEST HUMEAN. The Substitute
Strategy aims to make it less puzzling how two discontinuous types of fact
could be linked as tightly as SUPERVENIENCE says by representing the link-
age between normative and non-normative facts as itself a set of normative
truths, of the form R(p, x, c, a). This explains the general supervenience
of normative properties on non-normative properties, whatever they are, in
terms of a set of particular pure normative truths which delivers a corre-
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sponding set of truths about which specific non-normative facts are linked
with which specific mixed normative facts. (The issue here isn’t whether the
pure normative content of the R truths can be understood in other terms, by
giving a reductive definition of R. The issue is what explains why R holds of
some tuple when it does.) But for each pure normative truth we can ask:
why does R hold of <p, x, c, a>, not of some other tuple <q, y, d, b>? The
distribution of the R relationship over facts, agents, circumstances, and ac-
tions shouldn’t be arbitrary. The same question extends to the necessity of
these relationships: when <p, x, c, a> stands in R, why couldn’t that tu-
ple have failed to do so? When things are claimed to have some property
necessarily, a demand for explanation is usually legitimate. (As the logically
weaker demand, contingency is the default status for truths, at least when
their modal status is open to dispute. And the view that there are no unex-
plained necessities is a serious contender in metaphysics.) Why should the
R facts be an exception? Yet it seems to follow from Scanlon’s view that the
particular pure normative truths have no explanation (Scanlon 2014: 44).
A theory that provides no explanation is in that respect worse than one that
does, and in any case worse off insofar as the demand for explanation is
legitimate. Those who find it legitimate are bound to regard Scanlon’s ex-
planation of SUPERVENIENCE as leaving too many significant normative truths
unexplained. (Largely the same worries as above can be raised against ex-
planations of specific supervenience relations according to which there are
metaphysically necessary “normative laws” which specify that if something
has certain base properties, then it has certain normative properties, but no
explanation for why the normative laws are what they are; see e.g. Enoch
2011: 142-8.)
Reject SUPERVENIENCE?
A different way to defend moral non-naturalism against the supervenience
challenge is to reject SUPERVENIENCE. This strategy might seem quixotic since
SUPERVENIENCE seems to be supported by highly compelling intuitions. But if
these intuitions could be captured otherwise, there would be room to reject
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SUPERVENIENCE. Call this the Contingency Strategy. (The label is due to
Dreier MS. If SUPERVENIENCE is false when the innermost necessity is read as
metaphysical, then even the most basic moral principles are metaphysically
contingent.) To warrant rejecting SUPERVENIENCE, the Contingency Strategy
should give non-naturalism some distinctive explanatory advantage. But that
is by no means clear.
The most developed form of the Contingency Strategy is due to Gideon
Rosen (MS). Rosen argues that SUPERVENIENCE and non-naturalism form an
inconsistent triad with “essentialism” about metaphysical modality, and that
out of these three claims we should reject SUPERVENIENCE. Strong super-
venience entails that for each moral property M there is a condition con-
sisting of a set of base properties, Φ, which is equivalent to M as a mat-
ter of (metaphysical) necessity. At minimum Φ is a vast disjunction of the
complete specifications of all metaphysically possible bearers of M in all of
their base respects (Jackson 1998: 122-23). Rosen further supposes that Φ
is a naturalistic condition specifiable in wholly non-normative terms. (Many
non-naturalists agree, such as Shafer-Landau 2003.) But now assume the
essentialist theory of metaphysical modality: for a proposition p to be meta-
physically possible just is for p to be logically consistent with all of the essen-
tial truths, where an essential truth about a given item x (an object, property,
relation, etc.) is a truth that obtains in virtue of x’s nature or identity (Fine
1994). (For instance, being human is one of the things that lie in the essence
of Socrates, but being a member of the singleton set {Socrates} isn’t.) It fol-
lows that for each moral property M, there is a non-normatively specified
naturalistic condition Φ such that for some item x, the equivalence between
M and Φ is necessary in virtue of x’s nature. Isn’t this a form of moral natural-
ism? The necessary equivalence would be a synthetic truth, but Rosen takes
a distinctive commitment of moral non-naturalism to be that “someone who
knew the natural facts and the essences might still be in the dark about the
synthetic principles that connect the normative facts to their non-normative
grounds” (Rosen MS: 12). In short: SUPERVENIENCE and essentialism jointly
rule out non-naturalism.
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Why not put essentialism in the reject pile instead of SUPERVENIENCE?
Essentialism requires very substantial metaphysical commitments regarding
the essences of things and casts metaphysical necessity more narrowly than
many philosophers think. If, however, you are happy to work with essential-
ism, now ask yourself: in virtue of what item’s nature might the necessary
equivalence between (say) moral rightness and Φ hold? It won’t be anything
about Φ. For if the properties in Φ are wholly non-normative, then their na-
tures are normatively silent. Nor will it be anything about moral rightness.
For rightness won’t have heard of many of the non-normative properties and
relations in Φ, whatever they may be. It is hard to see what other item’s
nature could rule out the possibility that something is wrong but satisfies
Φ. (For discussion, see Leary forthcoming.) Given essentialism, the meta-
physically necessary equivalence between Φ and moral rightness fails if it is
logically consistent with all the essential truths that something is wrong but
satisfies Φ. And if the necessary equivalence fails, SUPERVENIENCE is false.
The point can be brought out with putative counterexamples:
Consider a world w that is just like the actual world in non-moral
respects, but in which act utilitarianism is true. Your act of read-
ing this paper, A, would have been wrong if w had been actual.
No matter how much benefit the world derives from your read-
ing this paper, you would have done more good licking stamps for
Oxfam instead. So we have a world w in which D(A), a descrip-
tion that gives a complete specification of the wholly non-moral
features of A, is true and A is wrong. Together with the actual
world – where D(A) is true and A is not wrong – this yields a
counterexample to supervenience. (Adapted from Rosen MS: 3.)
The point may also be put using an epistemological heuristic. You might
know all there is to know about the properties and relations in D(A) without
knowing whether A is right or wrong. And you might know all there is to
know about the nature of wrongness without knowing whether D(A) speci-
fies one of the wrong acts. So it seems that nothing in the essences of things
makes w impossible.
17
The metaphysical contingency of even the most fundamental explana-
tory principles of ethics – candidates for which include act utilitarianism,
Kant’s categorical imperative, Ross’s plurality of principles of prima facie duty,
and so on – might seem a suspect result. If St. Francis was a good person,
wouldn’t absolutely anyone exactly alike him in their non-moral properties
have to have been good as well? Rosen offers an innovative explanation of
these compelling intuitions. Although no moral truths are absolutely nec-
essary, some are “fact-independent,” where p is fact-independent if p is the
case and would have been the case no matter how things had been in wholly
non-normative respects (Rosen MS: 16). (Cohen 2003 introduces a simi-
lar notion of the fact-independence of moral principles, but in a different
context.) We might alternatively express this by saying that moral princi-
ples hold as a matter of a sui generis type of normative necessity which isn’t
reducible to metaphysical or natural necessity (Fine 2002). (Rosen offers
fact-independence as an explication of Fine’s notion of normative necessity.
Scanlon suggests that the necessity of his pure normative facts is an instance
of normative necessity; Scanlon 2014: 41 n. 40. See also Cuneo 2007b:
863-71.) On this view, act utilitarianism might still be true in some worlds
even if it is false in the actual world and would have been false no matter
how the non-normative facts had been. Thus it would be no objection to
the moral principles governing your (hopefully permissible!) reading of this
paper to say that those principles would have been false if act utilitarianism
had been true. If a moral principle is fact-independent, it would have been
true no matter what we had thought or done, no matter how hard we tried
to falsify it, no matter what the laws of nature had been, and so on. These
claims are analogous to the view that laws of nature aren’t metaphysically
necessary. Those taking this view usually think that laws of nature are ex-
plained by some metaphysically contingent facts. Is anything similar true
of fact-independent moral principles? What metaphysically contingent facts
would explain the important modal claims which morality supports, such as
that if torture is wrong, then torture would have been wrong no matter how
the non-moral facts had been?
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Be that as it may, the argument offers powerful reasons to regard fact-
independence as an important feature of moral principles and to think that
SUPERVENIENCE, understood as constraining all metaphysically possible in-
dividuals, is controversial in its own right and not required to make sense
of the practice of moral theory (Rosen MS: 17-19). Perhaps nothing impor-
tant is lost if we instead adopt the weaker supervenience thesis that moral
properties supervene on base properties as a matter of normative necessity.
(Non-naturalism will still be compatible with a restricted strong superve-
nience claim: it is metaphysically/conceptually necessary that if any items x
and y in worlds governed by the same set of basic moral principles M* are alike
in all base respects, then x and y must be alike in all moral respects. Note
that this would make supervenience a substantive moral truth; cf. Kramer
2009: ch. 10. It is less clear that nothing important is lost if non-naturalists
instead follow Hills 2009 and give up SUPERVENIENCE for the view that moral
differences are merely constantly conjoined with base differences.) I’ll close
with three reservations about the Contingency Strategy.
First, the Contingency Strategy won’t help non-naturalism in particular
because its characterization of moral naturalism is too narrow. The distinc-
tive commitment of moral naturalism is that moral facts and properties be-
long to the category of natural facts and properties. It doesn’t follow that
a property counts as natural only if it has a necessary equivalent specifiable
in wholly non-normative terms, since moral properties might meet the cri-
terion of naturalness directly in their own right (Sturgeon 2003: 536-40).
Naturalism secures SUPERVENIENCE trivially: moral properties cannot change
without a change in some natural properties, namely themselves.
Second, the Contingency Strategy might leave something morally impor-
tant unexplained. If act utilitarianism is the basic principle of morality in
some possible worlds but not ours, why is that? If sexism, speciesism, or vio-
lations of other people’s bodily integrity are moral obligations in some meta-
physically possible worlds, how come isn’t ours one of them? (Any partic-
ular examples will be controversial: the metaphysical contingency of moral
principles doesn’t imply that anything could have been morally permissible
or required. But constraints on what moral principles can be like, such as
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consistency and universalizability, may not suffice to rule out morally prob-
lematic variation. For instance, why cannot the moral judgments of a fanatic
Nazi who thinks he himself ought to have been exterminated if he had been
Jewish be consistent and universalizable? For discussion, see Hare 1981.)
The Contingency Strategy seems bound to say that these questions have no
answer. So if it is legitimate to demand answers to them, failure to explain
normative necessities would still be a strike against a theory that posits them.
Should no such explanation be forthcoming, the supervenience challenge to
non-naturalism might retain some of its bite even if we rejected strong su-
pervenience claims that constrain moral differences across all metaphysically
possible worlds. Moreover, even if the brute metaphysical contingency of the
basic moral principles weren’t problematic in itself, their seemingly conse-
quent brute authority might still be. Act utilitarianism might (as a matter of
metaphysical possibility) just as well have been the basic principle of moral-
ity. So why shouldn’t we be guided by it, in lieu of whatever moral principles
are basic for our world? Those who want the basic principles of morality
to close normative questions concerning their authority may therefore find
the Contingency Strategy argument unsatisfactory. (One explication of such
normative questions can be found in Korsgaard 1996.)
Third, the Contingency Strategy seems to entail too much moral luck.
Given moral contingency, it is metaphysically possible that the world could
have been just as it is in wholly non-moral respects but our actions had been
profoundly morally wrong. For if the basic moral principles had been dif-
ferent, then what we regard as morally creditable might have been morally
monstrous. Nor would we have known this: in any metaphysically possible
world which is non-morally just like the actual world, we would have the
same moral beliefs we actually have; in counter-moral worlds these beliefs
would be badly mistaken. If the basic moral principles are fact-independent
but metaphysically contingent, we are extremely fortunate that the things we
regard as morally innocuous aren’t systematically morally monstrous. But it
is incredibly hard to believe that we are merely lucky that the concern and re-
spect with which we try to treat others and the care and love with which we
try to raise our children are morally commendable rather than unspeakably
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and grotesquely evil. Yet that is our situation, according to the Contingency
Strategy. (This argument is due to Dreier MS.)
In conclusion, the Contingency Strategy is intriguing and deserves fur-
ther discussion both in its own right and as a response to the supervenience
challenge to moral non-naturalism. As it stands, however, it seems to pro-
vide no distinctive explanatory advantage to non-naturalism or, therefore, to
warrant the rejection of SUPERVENIENCE.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to formulate a compelling version of the superve-
nience challenge to non-naturalist moral realism and assess some of the most
promising responses to it. I have focused on two main strategies: rejecting
the relevant supervenience thesis (SUPERVENIENCE) and rejecting the claim
that non-naturalists must take moral supervenience to involve brute neces-
sary connections between discontinuous properties (BRUTE CONNECTION).
The responses I have considered raise fascinating issues. Some of these re-
sponses are nonetheless ineffective and even the most promising attempts
suffer from some explanatory shortcomings. The demands for explanation
on which these shortcomings are premised aren’t themselves uncontrover-
sial, however. Nor did I discuss how well some of the responses might work
together if combined. The supervenience challenge to non-naturalism is thus
not a closed chapter in metaethics.
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